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ABSTRACT  Nearly  four  decades  ago Stephen Marglin  explored the  origins  of  hierarchy  in  
capitalist  production  with  a  divide  and  conquer  hypothesis  based  on  the  idea  that  the  
monopolisation of knowledge about production technology plays a major role in explaining how 
workers are deprived of control over the labour process. Nevertheless, this explanation has some 
shortcomings  that  Marx  and  Babbage  had  avoided.  Those  two  authors  provided  a  highly  
accurate  and convincing  interpretation  of  the  division  of  labour  that  remains  relevant.  The  
present paper proposes a general synthesis of their analysis. Two points are emphasised: (1) the  
division of labour plays a major role in wage determination; and (2) the division of labour  
largely determines the form of subjection of labour to capital. 
1. Introduction
Why and how do capitalists  divide labour inside the production process?  The New Palgrave  
Dictionary of Economics defines the social division of labour as ‘the separation of employments 
and professions within society at large’ and the manufacturing division of labour as ‘the division 
of labour which takes place within the walls of a factory building or within the limits of a single 
industry’ (Groenewegen, 2008). We owe this distinction to Marx. As noticed by Fine (1998, p. 
177), ‘Marx argues that the interaction between these two forms of the division of labour is both 
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complex and indeterminate and not reducible by a technological imperative alone to the nature of 
the tasks themselves’. This theme was one of the major  topics in economics  during the 19 th 
century  but  received  little  attention  during  the  20th century.  Nevertheless,  two  major 
contributions on this issue were published almost at the same time, more than thirty five years 
ago: Marglin (1974) and Braverman (1974). Both are very critical towards the Smithian view 
based on the pin manufacture analysis and both emphasise that the division of labour is not a 
purely  technical  phenomenon;  for  both  authors,  the  division  of  labour  also  involves  the 
subordination of labour to capital in the production process.
Nonetheless, Marglin and Braverman construct their argument on different grounds. The 
latter  applies the work of Babbage and Marx to the transformations of industry and services 
during the 20th century whereas the former tries to interpret the emergence of the very early 
forms of capitalist production using a combination of neoclassical tools and some non-standard 
elements. Marglin’s innovative confrontation of the standard model with history leads him to 
propose his own heterodox ‘divide and conquer’ hypothesis to explain the subjection of workers 
in  the  production  process.  Marglin’s  paper  goes  further  than  most  others  in  developing this 
theme, and it is one of the most quoted and influential non-mainstream papers challenging the 
neo-institutionalist  wave.  Yet  Marglin’s  thesis  exhibits  a  tension  between  two  opposite 
interpretations which has been seldom noted (for an exception, see the Brighton Labour Process 
Group, 1977, pp. 7−8). It is however crucial for heterodox approaches to deal with such logical 
problems in order to support a credible theoretical alternative to the dominant model. As David 
Spencer (2000, p. 240) has recently noted, ‘the challenge is to rejuvenate the radicalism of labour 
process analysis’.1 Here we shall take up this  challenge,  following Braverman’s example,  by 
1 Spencer adds: ‘If contemporary trends towards precarious employment and intensified labour are not to 
be  accepted  as  “necessary  evils”  but  instead  understood  in  their  specific  connection  with  capitalist  
presenting a new reading of the two fundamental authors on the technical, or minute, division of 
labour: Babbage and Marx.
Before going further, two questions have to be addressed in this introduction. First, why 
should we revisit  Babbage and Marx? A major  assumption underlying this  paper  is  that  the 
division of labour is one of the foundational elements of a heterodox theory of the organisation 
of production in modern capitalism. Given the influence of Marglin’s article, we must inquire 
whether its argument should be considered a basic ingredient of such an approach. We shall 
argue that the ‘divide and conquer’ thesis fails to explain what Marx called the formal subjection 
of labour to capital, which does not ultimately rest on an uneven distribution of knowledge about 
production technologies, as Marglin contends, but on the division of society between a class of 
producers and a class of owners of the means of production. It is argued below that this class  
division, which is the essential feature of a capitalist society, cannot be deduced from the ‘divide 
and conquer’ thesis but on the contrary implies it. This points us back to Babbage and Marx, who 
expounded a robust theoretical framework for explaining why capitalists divide labour within the 
production process.
The second question is: what can be added to our knowledge of Babbage and Marx on the 
division of labour? The non-mainstream literature on the labour process (e.g. Brighton Labor 
Process Group, 1977; Elbaum et al., 1979; Lazonick, 1979, 1990, 1991; Rubery 1978; Burawoy 
1979; Coriat 1979) has not provided a genuine synthesis of the insights of Marx and Babbage. 
Even Braverman (1974) who played an important role in unearthing Babbage’s contribution has 
neither tried to dissect the latter’s Economy of Machinery and Manufacture (1832) nor to show 
in detail how it connects to the argument developed by Marx (1867) in chapters 13 to 15 of 
Capital, Vol. I and in the so-called ‘Chapter Six’ (the existence of which was probably unknown 
production, then the position of “critique” must once again take precedence in labour process analysis.’
to Braverman). It is hence not superfluous (i) to explain precisely how, for Babbage, the division 
of labour is used to cheapen labour power through narrow specialisation and task simplification, 
and how such a process forms the basis for the replacement  of labour by machinery;  (ii)  to 
clarify  Marx’s  distinctions  between subjective  and objective  division  of  labour  and between 
formal and real subordination of labour to capital; (iii) to show that the division of labour under 
capitalism involves a double-sided process of the organisation of production and of management 
reflecting  the  dual  nature  of  capitalist  production,  which  is  based  on  both  cooperation  and 
exploitation (though the cooperative aspect often goes unnoticed by the critical tradition); and 
(iv) to clarify the link between increasing returns and the division of labour.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes Marglin’s analysis of the division 
of labour and outlines the main difficulties displayed by the ‘divide and conquer’ explanation. 
Section 3 gives a reading of Babbage’s decisive contribution and Section 4 shows how Marx 
largely resumes the argument of the latter and deepens it by emphasising the coercive aspect of 
the division of labour.
2. Marglin
The main question addressed by Marglin in his 1974 paper on what bosses do is this: why are 
some individuals specialised in directing and commanding, and others specialised in obeying and 
executing the orders of the former? In other words, are there technological or economic reasons 
which could legitimate subjection of labour to capital in the sphere of production, and which 
could  explain  the  division  of  labour  between  workers  and bosses?  Marglin  gives  a  twofold 
answer to this general question. He begins with a refutation of Smith’s argument on the division 
of labour; then he proposes his own analysis, by borrowing from political analysis the notion of 
‘divide and conquer’.2 
It should be noted that Marglin is not particularly heterodox: his analysis is neither old 
institutionalist nor Marxist in character. He applies standard neoclassical analysis. His originality 
lies rather in his resort to history: he states that standard theory is invalided by historical events 
but, instead of looking for explanations given by other theorists concerned with history on this 
subject, he proposes his own thesis. As we shall see, Marglin’s argument is not fully convincing, 
which obliges us to turn to two old masters, Babbage and Marx, to understand more clearly the 
reasons why capitalists divide labour within the firm.
2.1. Marglin’s Critique of Smith’s Argument
For Smith, the division of labour is the main cause of increases in labour productivity. In the 
famous pin factory example, Smith (1776, Bk I, ch. 1) argues that the division of labour has three 
effects: (1) it increases individual dexterity; (2) it saves time that would otherwise be lost when 
moving one task to another;  and (3) it encourages the invention of new machines.3 Marglin, 
contends that Smith fails to understand properly the minute division of labour.
The second effect, for Marglin, can hardly justify the capitalist division of labour because 
‘to save “the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another” it is  
necessary only to continue in a single activity  long enough that the set-up time becomes an 
insignificant proportion of total work time. At most, the saving of time would only require that 
each worker continues in a single activity for days at a time, not for a life-time. Saving of time 
implies  separation of tasks and  duration of activity not  specialisation’ (Marglin, 1974, p. 67; 
2 For an overview and assessment of  Marglin’s contribution to radical political economy during the 
1970s, see Tinel (2004).
3 See Groenewegen (1977) for an assessment of Smith on the division of labour.
emphasis  added).  As  to  the  third  argument,  Marglin  observes  that  Smith  himself  is  not 
completely convinced, since a specialised production worker, whose task does not require him to 
exert his mind, is all the less likely to invent any kind of machine. Finally, concerning dexterity, 
Marglin (1974, pp. 68−69) is right to observe that
if Adam Smith were talking about musicians or dancers or surgeons, or even if we were 
speaking of the division of labor between pin-making and cloth-making, his argument 
would be difficult to counter. But he is speaking not of esoteric specialisations, nor of the 
social division of labor, but of the minute division of ordinary, run-of-the-mill, industrial 
activities  into  separate  skills.  ...  To  the  extent  that  the  skills  at  issue  are  difficult  to 
acquire, specialisation is essential to the division of production into separate operations. 
But, judging from the earnings of the various specialists engaged in pin-making, these 
were no special skills.
This  objection  is  linked  to  the  classical  argument  that  Smith  confuses  social  and  technical 
division of labour.
Thus, according to Marglin, Smith’s arguments cannot justify the existence of a minute 
specialisation particular to the division of labour. The best that the first and second arguments 
can do is to support the idea that the division of labour induces some modest improvements in 
productivity,  gains  that  are  too small  to  allow the division of labour  to play the  major  role 
ascribed to it by Smith. Unfortunately the alternative explanation that Marglin put forward to 
analyse the shift from pre-capitalist handicraft organisation of work to capitalist specialisation is 
also problematic.
2.2. The Division of Labour as a Divide and Conquer Strategy
Marglin’s idea is that specialisation was introduced by capitalists under the putting-out system to 
divide  and  conquer,  and  then  to  divide  and  rule,  the  production  process.  According  to  this 
argument, the division of labour did not increase productivity. It was simply a power strategy for 
capitalists to become essential, to create their function, as integrators of the separate operations 
that enter into the manufacture of a single commodity, without being genuinely productive.
The argument is in tension between two interpretations. On the one side, the ‘divide and 
conquer’  thesis  emphasises  the  relation  between  technology  and  social  organisation.  This 
remarkable  trait  of Marglin’s analysis  distinguishes  his  approach from both neoclassical  and 
some Marxian orthodoxies of the 20th century. The rejection of technological determinism was 
one  of  the  main  themes  in  radical  political  economy  during  the  1970s,  and  Marglin’s 
interpretation helps to explain the influence of his 1974 paper. But, on the other side, the very 
basis of his argument is essentially neoclassical, and does not match the historical sequence it is 
supposed to explain.
The ‘divide and conquer’ argument
Marglin starts by observing that in the pre-capitalists forms of production, the guild workman 
controls both the production and the marketing processes. This contrasts with capitalism where 
the worker does not sell a product but only his labour power. In the capitalist organisation of 
production, there is therefore an intermediary between the producer and the market; moreover, 
the worker no longer controls the labour process. Rejecting the Smithian technological argument, 
Marglin  builds  a  two-stage  explanation:  first,  the  capitalist  interposes  himself  between  the 
worker and the market which gives rise to the putting-out system; and then, in the next stage, the 
capitalist takes over the production process which initiates the rise of the factory system.
Marglin  compares  the  divide  and conquer  strategy to  the  political  strategies  used by 
colonial  powers  to  exploit  pre-existing  differences  and  impose  their  domination  by  making 
themselves  essential.  There  was  no  technological  superiority  of  the  first  capitalist  form  of 
production—the putting-out system—over the pre-capitalist one. The putter-outer has neither a 
special ability to integrate separate functions; nor does he introduce new methods of production: 
he  only  divides  the  production  process  and  assigns  workers  to  different  production  tasks, 
imposing himself  as the sole integrator  of the final product.  Blocked from access to a large 
market, because he produces only an unfinished product with almost no outlets for sale, instead 
of a finished commodity, each worker then becomes dependent on the putter-outer. The latter’s 
function is hence supposed to have been ‘artificially created to preserve the capitalist’s  role’ 
(Marglin,  1974,  p.  70).  The  capitalist  division  of  labour  is  mainly  viewed  as  a  device  for 
controlling  the  labour  force,  in  contrast  with  Smith’s  technological  interpretation  which 
completely ignores this aspect.
Intensification  of  competition  between  capitalist  putter-outers  makes  it  ever  more 
necessary for them to control not only the selling of the product but also the labour process itself 
in order to minimise costs. Under the putting-out system, workers were free to choose between 
work and leisure because they still controlled their labour process. By concentrating workers in 
their factories under their direct supervision and discipline, capitalists gain direct control over 
workers whose choice from then on is limited to ‘whether or not to work at all’ (Marglin, 1974, 
p.  93).  This  enables  bosses  to  reduce  costs  by intensifying  work effort,  without  necessarily 
increasing wages. Cost savings in this case are not motivated by the pursuit of technological 
efficiency, and the neoclassical model does not apply: ‘the discipline and supervision afforded by 
the factory had nothing to do with efficiency.… Disciplining the work force meant  a larger 
output in return for a greater input of labour, not more output for the same input. Supervising… 
the work force simply reduced the real wage.… [This] changed the division of the pie in favour 
of capitalists’ (Marglin, 1974, p. 94−95).
Lastly, among other non-standard features, Marglin’s approach underscores the role of 
class  struggle  in  capitalist  development.  In  particular,  he  develops  the  heterodox  idea  that 
technology is socially produced. Nevertheless, his argument is not without some questionable 
features, which we shall now examine.
The knowledge argument
What could prevent workers under the putting-out system from integrating the whole process of 
production  and thus  from crowding out  capitalists?  Marglin’s  answer is  ambiguous  because, 
beside the heterodox aspects  emphasised above,  he also considers  another  element:  ‘without 
specialisation,  the  capitalist  had  no essential  role  to  play  in  the  production  process.  If  each 
producer  could  himself  integrate  the  component  tasks  of  pin  manufacture  into  a  marketable 
product, he would soon discover that he had no need to deal with the market for pins through the 
intermediation of the putter-outer’ (Marglin, 1974, p.70). Marglin considers that knowledge is 
the central point here: the workers who could acquire or ‘discover’ the knowledge of the whole 
process of production would then also become capitalists themselves.4 This side of Marglin’s 
4 Marglin’s ambivalence between the Marxian argument based on property in the means of production, on 
the one hand, and the knowledge argument, on the other, is starkly evident in his story of the sandal  
maker: ‘I know a man who was for a time a sandal marker. To learn the trade, he went to work for a  
“master”  sandal  maker.  This  worthy  systematically  taught  him all  there  was to  know about  making 
sandals—except how to buy leather. My friend could have learned this vital aspect of the trade on his own 
by the familiar and time-honored method of trial and error—if he had had $1000 or so to set aside for the  
mistakes  inherent  in  the learning process.  Lacking the capital,  his  boss’s  unwillingness  to share  one 
particular skill effectively obliged him to remain a worker as long as he remained in the trade’ (Marglin,  
1974, p. 72).
approach explains why his article has been cited by the new orthodoxy, which views the labour 
process as information-creating, and the subordination of labour as an organisational innovation 
which enhances Pareto efficiency.
From this perspective, specialisation is a way for capitalists to keep workers ignorant of 
the technical  process and to remain essential  as the sole party able to integrate  the different 
operations into a single marketable product. Marglin developed this Austrian-flavoured argument 
in later work (Marglin, 1984).
But this account of the division of labour does not fit well with the historical period it 
aims  to  understand.  Indeed,  it  is  based  on  an  inversion  of  cause  and  effect  concerning  the 
analysis of the monopolisation of knowledge by the capitalist class. Marglin’s knowledge thesis 
holds only if knowledge of the craft has been lost by the workmen before the intervention of the 
capitalist. In other words, to be effective, the divide and conquer strategy described by Marglin 
requires the producers to discard the capacity to produce the commodity as a whole. But this 
hypothesis does not fit the historical period to which it is supposed to apply because its starting 
point is precisely the pre-capitalist handicraft organisation where every single producer knows 
how to  produce  a  commodity  from beginning to  end of  the  process,  as  noticed  by Marglin 
himself at the beginning of his 1974 article.
The elimination of the producers’ knowledge of their craft did not precede the advent of 
the capitalist division of labour. It is rather a result of this transformation. The deprivation of the 
workers’ knowledge is not a cause of the capitalist division of labour but its consequence. A 
more credible hypothesis is presume that workers accepted subordination to the putter-outers not 
because of their ignorance of the production process, but because they had no other option to 
survive. We will develop this thesis later in the discussion on Babbage and Marx.
Marglin  was  unable  to  give  a  convincing  explanation  of  the  minute  division  and 
specialisation of labour. His approach overemphasises the role of information, and ignores what 
has come to be known as the ‘Babbage principle’—the idea that the division of labour is used by 
capitalists to reduce labour cost. Marglin mainly pointed out an intensification effect based on 
discipline and control, but we will see that Babbage’s analysis is in a way more radical. In other 
words, the ‘divide and rule’ hypothesis, which is the heterodox side of the argument, can be 
more satisfactorily grounded in the work of Babbage and Marx.
3. Babbage 
Before Marx, Charles Babbage had probably made the greatest effort to understand the logic of 
the manufacturing division of labour. Babbage was a scientist who was particularly interested in 
machinery. His research led him to investigate how to introduce and generalise machinery in 
manufacturing  and drove him to the analysis  of the division of labour  inside  the workshop. 
Babbage is largely ignored by contemporary literature on the division of labour. This neglect is 
unfortunate, and it is significant that one of the few modern attempts to measure the division of 
labour  empirically  is  based  upon  Babbage’s  method  (see  West,  1999).  We  owe  to  Harry 
Braverman (1974), in his celebrated book on the transformations of the labour process during the 
20th century,  most  of  the  credit  for  the  rediscovery  of  Babbage’s  work  on the  Economy of  
Machinery and Manufacture (1832). Whereas Smith considered the division of labour on the 
basis of its pure physical or technical effects in terms of productivity without any reference to 
wages, Babbage immediately applies an economic approach with monetary prices. He seeks an 
‘explanation of the cheapness of manufactured articles, as consequent upon division of labour’ 
(Babbage, 1832, p. 115). This issue is equivalent to Marglin’s question: what is the  economic 
gain for capitalists of dividing the labour process? Wondering what the economic benefit in the 
division of labour is to those who decide to implement it led Babbage to consider how increasing 
productivity is neither the sole nor the main effect of specialisation. Moreover, Babbage shows 
that this particular way to organise labour is mainly a means to reduce wage costs because it  
enables the manufacturer to select skills accurately.
Before  exposing  what  has  been  called  his  ‘principle’,  Babbage  reviews  the  classical 
arguments favourable to the division of labour and specialisation.  Some of them, like set-up 
time, he describes without significant modification; others like ‘the time required for learning’ 
are reinterpreted with clear-sightedness. We first consider the classical arguments that he accepts 
without modification.
3.1. The Classical Arguments that Babbage Accepted without Modification
The Smithian argument of the time ‘which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work 
to another’ is split  by Babbage into two sub-arguments.  One deals with ‘changing from one 
occupation to another’ in general, whereas the other focuses particularly on the change of tools. 
But  both  discussions  amount  roughly  to  what  Smith  put  forward.  On  the  ability  to  invent 
machines,  Babbage  makes  a  subtle  distinction  between  tools,  supposed  to  be  effectively 
improved by workers, and machines, which require special skills to be imagined. This passage is 
also the occasion for Babbage to emphasise how the division of labour prepares the way for 
mechanisation: ‘Such an improvement in the tool is generally the first step towards a machine....  
When each process has been reduced to the use of some simple tool, the union of all these tools, 
actuated by one moving power, constitutes a machine’ (Babbage, 1832, pp. 114−115).
The first important element that is worth pointing out is dexterity. We saw before that this 
is  the main argument  by which Smith explains  the division of labour.  Babbage contests  the 
relevance, or at least the primacy, of this factor. He considers its impact to be temporary; its 
advantage over manufactures with processes that are less subdivided tends to disappear quickly: 
‘for, thought it acts at the commencement of an establishment, yet every month adds to the skill 
of the workmen; at the end of three or four years they will not be very far behind those who have  
never practised any other branch of their art’ (Babbage, 1832, p. 114). So we may now turn to 
what Babbage himself considered the most essential argument on this issue.
3.2. The Apprenticeship Period
Before turning to Babbage’s famous ‘principle’, it will be useful to examine his discussion of the 
‘time required for learning’. Babbage (1832, pp. 112−113) notes at the beginning of his chapter 
19 that ‘the proportion of time occupied in the acquisition of any art will depend on the difficulty 
of its execution; and that the greater the number of distinct processes, the longer will be the time 
which  the  apprentice  must  employ  in  acquiring  it.’  Marglin  made  a  similar  point,  but  the 
reasoning  here  is  different  from  Marglin’s  contest  of  specialisation  as  a  means  to  achieve 
significant improvements in productivity. Babbage goes further on the issue of learning. For him, 
the division and specialisation of labour reduces the time,  and thus the cost incurred by the 
employer, of apprenticeship:
Five or seven years have been adopted, in a great many trades, as the time considered  
requisite for a lad to acquire a sufficient knowledge of his art, and to enable him to repay  
by his labour, during the latter portion of his time, the expense incurred by his master at 
its commencement. If, however, instead of learning all the different processes for making 
a needle,  for  instance, his attention be confined to one operation, the portion of time 
consumed unprofitably at the commencement of his apprenticeship will be small, and all  
the  rest  of  it  will  be beneficial  to  his  master:  and  consequently,  if  there  be  any 
competition amongst the masters, the apprentice will be able to make better terms, and 
diminish the period of his servitude. (Babbage, 1832, p. 113)
Babbage notes that specialisation is beneficial to the apprentice, for it reduces the period during 
which he has to stay at his master’s workshop; but this gain of formal liberty for the young 
workers is only a secondary aspect of the issue.
The central point for Babbage is that the master, who decides how to utilise the labour that 
he hires and how to organise the production process, has an incentive to implement the minute 
division of labour and specialisation because it  increases the amount of time, over the entire 
period of employment, during which his young employee works for him profitably. As required 
skills diminish with minute specialisation, the time and the cost to produce a new worker of 
sufficient skill is reduced. But, this cost reduction in the production of a worker suited to the 
tasks designed for him by his boss is beneficial to the master for a more basic reason: ‘the facility 
of acquiring skill in a single process, and the early period of life at which it can be made a source  
of profit, will induce a greater number of parents to bring up their children to it; and from this 
circumstance also, the number of workmen being increased, the wages will soon fall’ (ibid.). 
Thus,  in  the end the minute division of labour  and specialisation  reduce the price of labour 
because it increases the supply of labour suited to a particular job.5 As we shall see below, this 
original argument indirectly plays a major role in Babbage’s ‘principle’. We shall also see how 
Marx strengthens significantly Babbage’s sharp intuition about the effect of specialisation on the 
5 Babbage (1832, p. 113) notes that, in addition to its affect on wages, the minute division of labour also 
reduces waste of raw material: ‘if each man commit this waste [of raw material] in acquiring successively 
every process, the quantity of waste will be much greater than if each person confine his attention to one 
process; ... therefore, the division of labour will diminish the price of production.’
supply of labour.
Babbage’s argument is very different from the one advanced by Smith and those who came 
after him, such as Marshall. Babbage argues that manufacturers introduce minute specialisation 
not for productivity reasons but for a motive of profitability.6 What is original here, compared to 
other common discussions on the division of labour,  is  that  bosses have an incentive to use 
minute specialisation even if it yields no increase of productivity.
3.3. The Babbage Principle
Let us now consider Babbage’s ‘principle’, which is his main explanation of why manufacturers 
divide and specialise labour. The principle states:
That  the  master  manufacturer,  by  dividing  the  work  to  be  executed  into  different  
processes, each requiring different degrees of skill or of force, can purchase exactly that  
precise quantity of both which is necessary for each process; whereas, if the whole work 
were executed by one workman, that person must possess sufficient skill to perform the 
most difficult, and sufficient strength to execute the most laborious, of the operations into 
which the art is divided. (Babbage, 1832, p. 116)
Babbage then undertakes a quantitative examination of the production process in the famous pin 
factory example, comparing the cost of production in the case of minute specialisation with the 
case  of  no  specialisation.  He  concludes  that  dividing  and  specialising  the  work  allows  a 
reduction of the monetary cost of production. This analysis is an applied demonstration of his 
principle.  Then he delivers  his  conclusion  as  a  prescription  for capitalists  who wish survive 
6 It is striking to see how authors who advocate the ‘Smith-Marshall-Young’ model,  such as Lavezzi 
(2003) and Rima (2004), thoroughly ignore the logical shortcomings raised by critics like Babbage and 
Marglin.
competition and increase their earnings: ‘The higher the skill required of the workman in any one 
process of a manufacture, and the smaller the time during which it is employed, so much the 
greater will be the advantage of separating that process from the rest, and devoting one person’s 
attention entirely to it’ (Babbage, 1832, p. 122). 
Thus the Babbage principle says that the minute division of labour is a way for a capitalist 
to reduce his demand for skilled workers and hence to increase the use of lower-waged unskilled 
workers. His approach is neither prescriptive nor normative: he explains how those who organise 
production,  the  capitalists,  have  an  incentive  to  divide  work  and  then  to  replace  work  by 
machines.  He does  not  concern himself  with any supposed ‘efficiency’  criteria  which  might 
override particular interests. In Babbage’s framework a shift from one situation to another does 
not necessarily benefit all parties: he does not try to conceal the conflicts, class struggle and 
coercion which lie behind transformations in the production sphere.
At this point Babbage does not explain why the increase in demand for unskilled labour 
would not balance the increase of supply. Nor do we know why he supposes that the wage bill 
should decrease because of the division of labour. It is only in chapter 32 ‘On the effect of 
machinery in reducing the demand for labour’ that Babbage revisits this issue. The short-term 
‘effect  of  new machines  is  to  diminish  the  labour  required  for  the  production  of  the  same 
quantity  of  manufactured  commodities’  (Babbage,  1832,  p.  213).  He  believes,  though,  that 
mechanisation typically leads to a net increase in the demand for labour, because of the increased 
demand for labour to build the machinery (ibid., p. 214). But the workers who are displaced by 
machines are not those who build them because ‘Frequently the new labour requires ... a higher 
degree  of  skill  than  the  old;  and,  unfortunately,  the  class  of  persons  driven  out  of  the  old 
employment are not always qualified for the new one; so that a certain interval  must elapse 
before the whole of their labour is wanted’ (ibid.).
Marx took up and completed Babbage’s analysis. 
4. Marx
We will focus only on the passages of  Capital  that are pertinent to the topic at hand, mainly 
chapters 13, 14 and 15, and on what has come to be called ‘Chapter six’.7 We will see how Marx 
uses Babbage’s argument and goes beyond it to show that the division of labour contributes to 
the production of both use values and surplus value,  so that we must bear in mind not only 
technical  considerations  but  also  social  factors  such  as  class  struggle.  Marx  integrates  the 
theoretical analysis of the division of labour into the historical analysis of capitalist development, 
which  he  views  as  shaped  by  social  conflicts  that  partially  determine  the  organisation  of 
production and the choice of technology.
We  begin  with  Marx’s  explanation  of  why  capitalists  gather  many  workers  under  their 
command, in which fixed costs play an important role that is generally ignored by other authors, 
including Babbage. Then Marx exposes the logic of minute specialisation, which prepares the 
way for mechanisation and for the development of the objective division of labour. The division 
of labour is, for Marx, not a purely physical phenomenon, as suggested by the Smithian tradition, 
but a coercive device aimed at facilitating accumulation.
4.1. Cooperation and Increasing Returns
For Marx, the point of departure for any capitalist form of production is cooperation: capitalist 
7 The draft entitled ‘Chapter 6. Results of the Direct Production Process’ was probably written in 1864.  
Marx had apparently intended at one point to include it in  Capital Volume I, but in the end he set the 
argument aside. This manuscript remained unpublished until the 1960s, when portions of it appeared in 
Italian and French.
production  necessarily  involves  several  people  working  together.8 Thus,  by  definition, 
cooperation is opposed to individual and scattered production which cannot be considered as 
capitalist. Why do capitalists employ many workers together? Babbage had nothing to say on 
this issue. For Marx, employing several workers at the same time for the same purpose generates 
more surplus-value than can be obtained by the same number of people working separately. The 
set of workers collectively producing this additional surplus-value is not reducible to the sum of 
its  components.  It  forms  a  collective  labourer.  Cooperation  opposes  itself  to  individual 
production and thus also opposes producers’ dispersion of labour.
By definition, this social productive power of labour involves increasing returns to scale. 
These  gains  of  cooperation  ensue  from two  sources.  On  the  one  hand,  cooperation  allows 
economising on fixed costs  and, on the other,  the additional  force attached to the collective 
labourer  is  above all  a result  of  simultaneity  and combination  of actions  oriented  towards a 
common objective. Since fixed costs increase with the total value of constant capital (machines), 
increasing returns become more significant with the accumulation of capital over time, i.e. with 
the development of the capitalist division of labour.
According to Marx, capitalists started by concentrating many handicraft workers in the 
same place in factories in order to realise and appropriate the additional surplus-value created by 
the social productive power of labour. At this stage, workers remained in possession of their 
trade.  Thus capital  could not fully control the production process; subordination of labour to 
capital was purely formal: the capacity of the capitalist to control the worker rested only on the 
economic  dependency  of  the  latter.  The  formal  subordination  of  labour  corresponds  to  the 
8 As used here, the word has nothing to do with any normative idea of common good or common 
interest; it merely designates the collaborative nature of production.  For a critical discussion of 
Marx’s notion of cooperation, see Lazonick (1990, pp. 58−67).
absolute surplus value (see Table 1). The lay-off threat was hence considered by Marx as the 
primitive moment of subordination of labour to capital. Nevertheless, this formal capacity was 
decisive, for it enables capitalists to implement the first stage of the minute division of labour 
and specialisation.  This phase, the subjective division of labour, consisted in breaking up the 
trade  and then  destroying individual  control  over  the production  process  by having workers 
specialise on a limited range of tasks.
Table 1: Correspondence between subordination, surplus value and division of labour
4.2. The Subjective Division of Labour
A trade is made of a set of various skills and techniques, the acquisition of which is relatively 
time  consuming.  It  rests  upon  dexterity  associated  with  several  more  or  less  specific  and 
sophisticated manual tools. The craftsman both conceives and carries out his own work; there is 
no separation between conception and execution. Indeed, the trade enables the worker to control 
the production of a whole commodity, to be an independent producer.
According to  Marx,  the  first  movement  towards  real  appropriation  of  the  production 
process by capital corresponded to the development of the subjective division of labour.9 This 
phenomenon had already been described by Babbage. The early stage of minute division and 
9 For Marx, the term ‘subjective’ refers to human beings and the term ‘objective’ to things.
specialisation  consisted  in  breaking  up  trades  in  order  to  reconstitute  the  whole  production 
process on the basis of the tasks comprising it. This division of labour is subjective in the sense 
that task separation and specialisation does not rest upon a material process but on a convention, 
or an obligation, imposed on workers by the employer.
Until  then,  the  same  technique  could  be  used  by  different  trades  inside  the  same 
manufacture.  This  technique  was  then  mastered  by craftsmen  of  different  trades.  And those 
craftsmen had also mastered several techniques, for which the training time could be long. But 
with the new division of labour, workers specialised in only one task, and trades remained in 
manufactures only at the level of the collective labourer instead of the individual craftsmen. As a 
consequence, Marx argues, a new specialisation limiting individual skill took place not around 
trades but around methods composing them. From a combination of trades, manufacture then 
became a combination of processes. With increasing demand and concentration of capital, the 
intensification of production led each operation to be subdivided in its turn. Mechanisation had 
not yet developed in manufactures.
Productivity gains were produced by the division of labour at only two levels. On the one 
hand, set-up time was reduced, diminishing the porosity of the working day: more work was 
realised per day, its intensity increasing. On the other hand, individual dexterity also increased; 
but it was especially at the level of the collective labourer that the trade was mastered better in  
terms  of  dexterity  compared  to  individual  craftsmen.  At  this  point  in  his  reasoning,  Marx 
summarises Babbage’s idea and quotes his famous principle in a footnote.
This  new  organisation  of  specialised  labour  segments  work  and  creates  a  detailed 
hierarchy of wages. Under this segmented work, a class of unskilled labour developed, so that 
even the absence of specialisation becomes a speciality. Compared to handicraft, the labour force 
became  either  specialised  into  a  few  tasks  or  not  specialised  at  all.  Marx,  like  Babbage, 
emphasises the economic effects induced by this shaping of the production process in accordance 
with the needs of capital: minute specialisation requires less apprenticeships which reduces their 
value and increases (relative) surplus-value all the more:
Alongside of the hierarchic gradation there steps the simple separation of the labourers 
into skilled and unskilled.  For  the  latter,  the  cost  of  apprenticeship vanishes;  for  the 
former, it diminishes, compared with that of artificers, in consequence of the functions 
being simplified. In both cases the value of labour-power falls.... The fall in the value of 
labour-power,  caused  by  the  disappearance  or  diminution  of  the  expenses  of 
apprenticeship, implies a direct increase of surplus-value for the benefit of capital; for 
everything  that  shortens  the  necessary  labour-time  required  for  the  reproduction  of  
labour-power, extends the domain of surplus-labour. (Marx, 1867, p. 240).
The essence of minute division and specialisation for Marx is that, by transforming the 
complex labour of craftsmen into simple labour of unskilled workers, it reduces the labour-time 
necessary  for  the  reproduction  of  labour-power,  which  amounts  to  a  reduction  of  wages. 
Specialisation shifts  distribution  in favour of capital  not so much because of the increase in 
productivity  as  because  of  the  reduction  of  value  of  labour  power  that  it  directly  induces. 
Indirectly, the division of labour increases competition amongst workers at each level of the skill 
hierarchy because each job, being simplified and hence easier to perform, can now be done by a 
greater  number  of  workers.  Minute  specialisation  makes  each  individual  worker  more 
dispensable and more easily replaceable for the employer. For Marx, as for Babbage, the main 
economic effect pursued by capitalists with the division of labour is to reduce the bargaining 
power of workers.
The minute specialisation dispossesses the individual worker of control over the whole 
production process, which now exists only at the workshop level. Mastery of knowledge of the 
craft exists only at the collective level, and hence could be appropriated by capital,  just as it 
appropriated the social  productive power of labour.  Capital  seeks to dominate all  knowledge 
useful for its valorisation: by separating conception from execution, the minute division of labour 
renders workers subject to capital and increases their dependency (see Marx, 1864). From that 
moment, the labour process is not shaped by the producer but by capital for its own valorisation.  
The worker cannot work in his own way anymore, but is constrained to work as his employer  
dictates.  He is now constrained not only by the threat of dismissal,  but also by the material  
organisation of the labour process itself.  Even though mechanisation has not yet occurred, the 
subjective division of labour enables capital both to start subordinating labour in earnest and to 
trigger the process of relative surplus-value (see once again Table 1).
It is important to note that the dispossession of the worker’s knowledge of his trade is not 
the cause but the consequence of the subordination of labour to capital: Marx’s argument clearly 
shows why Marglin’s explanation based on the monopolisation of knowledge is not persuasive. 
We have seen how Marx does not need to assume that in the earliest stage of capitalism workers  
accept  subordination  to  capital  because  they  lacked  the  knowledge  needed  to  produce 
commodities. On the contrary, he recognises that the first workers who were subordinated to 
capital  were still  controlling  their  own trade.  These  workers  accepted  loss  of  liberty  simply 
because  they  had no choice:  they did not  have  enough money to  buy raw materials  and to 
maintain themselves until their products were ready for sale. Economic dependency, resulting in 
particular from primitive accumulation, precedes the monopolisation of knowledge. This idea is 
nicely expressed by Marx in a famous passage from the chapter devoted to the buying and selling 
of labour-power:
Nobody—not even ‘a musician of the future’—can live upon future products, or upon 
use-values in an unfinished state; and ever since the first moment of his appearance on  
the world’s stage, man always has been, and must still be a consumer, both before and 
while he is producing. In a society where all products assume the form of commodities,  
these commodities must be sold after they have been produced, it is only after their sale  
that they can serve in satisfying the requirements of their producer. The time necessary  
for  their  sale  is  superadded  to  that  necessary  for  their  production.  (Marx, 1867,  p. 
117−118)
Section 4.4 will consider the issue of the causality between knowledge and subordination from 
the other side of the coin, i.e. command and coercion.
Like craftsmen’s bodies, tools were transformed and adapted; they became specialised 
and more and more differentiated from one another. Those improvements and simplifications, on 
the one hand, fitted the needs of specialised labour and, on the other, ‘create[d] at the same time 
one of the material conditions for the existence of machinery, which consists of a combination of 
simple instruments’ (Marx, 1867, p. 236).
4.3. The Objective Division of Labour
Mechanisation enables production to be carried out on a much greater scale than is possible 
using  muscle  power.  Until  the  emergence  of  the  factory  system,  the  division  of  labour  in 
manufactures was subjective because tasks were designed in advance for workers; but within the 
factory, the division of labour becomes objective, in the sense that it is embodied in machinery, 
to  which  the  workers  are  compelled  to  adjust.  Once  subdivision  of  tasks  took  place  in 
manufacturing, workers were replaced in the factory by machines designed by capital for its own 
purposes. The instruments of production start competing with the labour force, but not all forms 
of labour disappear: machinery needs to be operated and maintained by unskilled labour, and 
labour is also necessary to build it.
The rise and the diffusion of machinery from one branch to another in industry induce a 
double movement. At the level of use, mechanisation renders specialised labour in manufactures 
useless because when it is adopted only unskilled and undifferentiated labour is needed on the 
shop floor,  while some skilled labour is still  retained at  the top of the hierarchy to perform 
conceptual and managerial functions for the benefit of capital. When it comes to the production 
of machinery itself, a new industry emerges: building machinery initially requires craftsmen and 
specialists. The sector which produces machines itself progressively becomes mechanised, and 
the minute division of labour appears and develops in this branch. With the generalisation of 
machinery,  technical  change leads to the gradual replacement  of obsolete  machines by more 
advanced  machines.  The  machinery  process  creates  a  bi-polarisation  of  the  labour  force. 
Specialised  workers  are  replaced  by  an  undifferentiated  labour  force  while  a  labour  force 
specialised  in the production,  maintenance  and monitoring  of  machinery  is  then required  by 
capital.  The  latter  group  forms  a  class  of  superior  workers  which  Marx  thought  would  be 
numerically insignificant. But this binary segmentation is never achieved as such, it is only a 
process which is activated and interrupted as machinery develops in new domains and as other 
activities disappear. Of course,  Marx makes the hypothesis that the share of unskilled labour 
tends to rise, but actual labour force segmentation involves not two but several layers.10
With machinery, the capital is not only able to do without muscle-power but also without 
the specialised manufacturing worker on the shop floor; skilled labour power is still used mainly 
for  conceptual  work  and  management.  A  superfluous  population  is  created  by  machinery, 
10 The literature on labour market segmentation is huge and cannot be examined here; for an overview see  
Fine (1998).
increasing all the more the competition among workers, and reducing still further the value of 
labour power. Factory workers become easily replaceable. Whereas manufacturing workers still 
control  collectively  the  mastering  of  trades  they  had  lost  individually,  the  subjection  to 
machinery definitively deprived labour of any control over the production process, to the benefit 
of capital.
4.4. The Division of Labour as a Coercive Device
Very few economists would argue today that ‘in a perfectly competitive market it really doesn’t 
matter  who  hires  whom’  (Samuelson,  1957,  p.  894)  and  yet,  in  recent  literature  on  ‘the 
organisation’  or ‘the firm’ it  is  seldom clear  why, and in what  terms, some people exercise 
command over others. The purpose of this last subsection is to recall the implication of Marx’s 
analysis of cooperation, which remains particularly essential on this issue and has been largely 
overlooked even by the Marxist tradition itself. After stating to what extent cooperation involves 
coordination,  whatever  the  mode of  production,  the  double  nature  of  command in  capitalist 
production is clarified.
As noted above, for Marx, cooperation constitutes the foundational feature of capitalist 
production.  The social  productive  power  of  labour  is  created  both by emulation  and by the 
simultaneous conjunction of individual forces oriented towards a common objective. At this very 
primitive level of organisation, there is no minute division of labour: the workers either do the 
same thing or practice different crafts in the same field of work. The special productive power of 
the collective labourer results only from the joint action, which presupposes a common goal and 
a concerted plan. The more numerous the labourers working together, the more it is necessary to 
organise the set of simultaneous actions, for otherwise disorder could limit the productive effect 
of the combination of activities. Cooperation creates a specific need for direction to coordinate 
individual activities because it is presumed by Marx that decentralisation of individual actions is 
not able to lead to self-organisation. This idea is expressed by the metaphor of the orchestra and 
the conductor:
All combined labour on a large scale requires, more or less, a directing authority, in order 
to secure the harmonious working of the individual activities, and to perform the general 
functions that have their origin in the action of the combined organism, as distinguished 
from the action of its separate organs. A single violin player is his own conductor; an 
orchestra requires a separate one. (Marx, 1867, p. 227)
Marx supposes that  coordination requires a specific  function with specific  skills.  The simple 
cooperation, which creates this ‘work of directing, superintending, and adjusting’ (Marx, 1867, 
p. 227), existed even before the capitalist  era in all civilisations, but at that time it was only 
employed  sporadically  to  raise  dolmens,  pyramids,  cathedrals  or  temples.  Therefore,  the 
direction function which comes from the need for coordination inherent in simple cooperation is 
not itself produced by the social organisation in which it takes place; it is transhistorical: ‘co-
operation is a necessary concomitant of all production on a large scale, but it does not, in itself,  
represent a fixed form characteristic of a particular epoch in the development of the capitalist  
mode of production’ (Marx, 1867, p. 229). In other words, the direction function ensuing from 
the social aspect of production is not unique to capitalism: it is necessary whenever many people 
work together.
When many labourers  are  working together,  the  simultaneity  and combination  of  their 
actions create a new productive force. This social productive power of labour resulting from 
cooperation can only exist if individual actions are properly and consciously coordinated. This 
specific  function of command that  consists  in coordinating is  not in itself  despotic.  It is not 
created by a particular exploitation system: it is revealed in many different types of societies 
throughout history.
But what are the features of command specific to capitalist production? For Marx, there is 
a  distinctive  relation  between  simple  cooperation  and  capitalism.  Whereas  pre-capitalist 
economic systems are marked by a dispersed and individualised process of production in which 
the worker is subject only to the conventions of his trade (i.e. craft,  métier or profession), the 
capitalist  mode  of  production,  on  the  contrary,  systematically  involves  cooperation.  No 
developed capitalist form of production is possible without cooperation and, therefore, capitalist 
production ‘only then really begins  ... when each individual capital employs simultaneously a  
comparatively large number of labourers’ (Marx, 1867, p. 223). It requires a material condition 
of  central  importance  that  has  to  be attained  beforehand:  the concentration  of  the  means of 
production and subsistence in the hands of capitalists has to be large enough to provide them 
scope to buy the labour power of a great number of workers.
The capitalist  controls the coordination function peculiar to cooperation not because he 
possesses any special coordinating skill or knowledge, but only because he can afford to gather 
many workers together, and he has the power to direct their actions because he already possesses 
enough funds to do so and not the other way round. In answer to the numerous authors who 
sought to vindicate the entrepreneur by virtue of his alleged capacity to steer an organisation, 
Marx (1867, p. 228) writes: ‘It is not because he is a leader of industry that a man is a capitalist;  
on the contrary, he is a leader of industry because he is a capitalist. The leadership of industry is 
an attribute of capital, just as in feudal times the functions of general and judge, were attributes 
of landed property.’
This  systematic  use  of  cooperation  in  capitalist  production  gives  the  illusion  of  the 
‘eternal necessity’ of the lords of capital. One could therefore come to believe that the surplus-
value appropriated by the capitalist proceeds from his productive contribution as manager. But, 
Marx reminds us that the capitalist mode of production requires expansion of the extraction of 
surplus-value. This requirement of the system adds a second element to the direction function 
disconnected from cooperation as such. It makes the direction function despotic or authoritarian 
because the labour force has to create as much surplus-value as possible:
the control of the capitalist is in substance two-fold by reason of the two-fold nature of 
the process of production itself, which, on the one hand, is a social process for producing 
use values,  on the other,  a  process  for  creating surplus-value in  form that  control  is 
despotic. (Marx, 1967, p. 227−228)
From the point of view of capital, the labour force has to be exploited as much as possible, which 
requires its subjection. This despotism obviously creates a resistance among workers who try not 
only to protect themselves from overexploitation but also to extend their relative autonomy at 
work despite the deskilling to which they have been subjected. These counter-pressures by the 
labour force constantly oblige capital to renew the technology and the organisation of the labour 
process to circumvent a loss of control.
In capitalist  production,  command is therefore double-sided: coordination comes from 
cooperation,  despotism from the  capitalistic  character  of  production.  On  a  theoretical  level, 
nothing requires the direction function to become despotic. Despotism in capitalist production is 
not intrinsic to the need for coordination imposed by the social aspect of production; it is simply 
intrinsic to capitalism, which requires the expansion of surplus-value. To talk of ‘democracy in 
firms’, then, means nothing if we do not specify which kind of firm is involved.
Capitalist production is intrinsically despotic and the division of labour appears as one of 
the principal devices by which capital is able to exert real control over labour. By returning to the 
Babbage-Marx tradition we can see that Marglin does not fully grasp the particular nature of 
authority  in  the capitalist  production process.  Instead,  he substitutes  generalised  authority  in 
place of the double-sided command of capitalist production.
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